

Chapter Eight

The Alternatives

Conserving Energy

The cheapest, most sensible way to avoid air pollution and global warming emissions from fossil fuels is to simply avoid the need for their use. Conservation and improved efficiency provide an enormous well of energy that now flows unused through our windows, tailpipes, and walls.

Since the first oil shock of 1973, the United States has begun to tap the conservation well. As a consequence, the United States today uses 28 percent less energy to produce a dollar of gross national product than it did in 1973,¹⁸⁰ and the potential for further savings are vast. Other countries, such as Germany and Japan, are twice as energy efficient as the United States.

The notion that energy consumption must necessarily expand as economic growth occurs was tossed out years ago by informed economists, but industry interests and traditional energy planners are understandably loathe to relinquish their hold on the marketing of energy. In the late 1970s when President Jimmy Carter extolled the American people to save energy, many scoffed, but energy conservation has worked beyond expectations.

Since the late 1980s, the United States is saving 14 million barrels of oil every day,¹⁸¹ because of "plugged steam leaks, caulk guns, duct tape, insulation," and increased auto fuel efficiency.¹⁸² Those energy savings have also resulted in an annual benefit of \$150 billion in reduced fuel costs in the United States.¹⁸³

With this historical perspective, the impetus to expand efficiency and conservation should be powerful, but the Reagan and Bush administrations were steadfastly resistant to energy reform. According to the Worldwatch Institute, all U.S. spending on energy efficiency research and development combined in 1990 would have financed the U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf for less than three days.¹⁸⁴ Yet in the midst of the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration released its National Energy Strategy with a commitment to the status quo: fossil fuel and nuclear energy as the cornerstones of America's energy future.

The potential energy savings to be achieved by energy efficiency alone should be of vital interest to the country that contributes nearly one-quarter of the world's fossil fuel-generated carbon dioxide emissions. Writing in *Issues in Science and Technol-*

ogy, Michael Shepard, Director of the energy program at the Rocky Mountain Institute states:

Estimates of untapped energy savings range widely, but they are all large. The Electric Power Research Institute, the utility industry's research arm, estimates that U.S. electricity demand could be reduced by up to 44 percent by the year 2000 through efficiency gains made with existing technology. My colleagues and I at Rocky Mountain Institute believe that the potential cost-effective savings are even larger, conceivably as much as 75 percent of total U.S. energy demand.¹⁸⁵

These figures sound almost unbelievable. Indeed, in the current political reality and an energy market absorbed with fossil fuels in general and natural gas in particular, they are not realizable. A full-out reorientation of the country's energy policy must begin soon if these energy savings are to be effected in time to slow climate change and allow implementation of clean energy systems. Although the Clinton/Gore administration promises to return to the principles espoused by Carter in the 1970s—efficiency and renewables—their early policy statements regarding expanded use of natural gas and “clean” coal are in conflict with that promise.

Energy Efficiency in Less-Industrialized Countries

Energy efficiency is also critically important to the less-industrialized world, where energy consumption is predicted to increase precipitously during the next 20 years. If traditional approaches to energy use continue, CO₂ emissions from Eastern Europe and less-industrialized countries could exceed those from all industrialized countries combined by the year 2010.¹⁸⁶

This will result in a double tragedy. The first is that global warming emissions and the full range of fossil fuel cycle impacts

will wildly increase. The second is that the harsh poverty under which much of the world's population now lives will also increase. Centralized fossil fuel systems and large-scale hydropower displace people in order to provide energy to industrial centers and the elite few, but often do not provide relief to poor people who cannot find enough energy for cooking and other survival activities due to increasing shortages of biomass for fuel. People who do not have enough wood to cook rice live within a stone's throw of 36-inch pipelines conveying natural gas to urban centers.

The World Bank estimates that investments of \$1 trillion will be required in the next decade to meet just the electricity needs of less-industrialized countries, yet only \$10 to \$12 billion per year will be available from the multilateral lending agencies (which provide 80 percent of the foreign exchange for power sector investments).¹⁸⁷

Many less-industrialized countries are already under crippling debts incurred for energy—up to 40 percent of the accumulated public debt in some countries.¹⁸⁸ Yet free trade accords such as NAFTA and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative will lock in dependence on fossil fuels as an export commodity, as well as exclude demand-side energy planning that would save finite resources and dollars. (See Stump and Alexander. *The North American Free Trade Agreement and Energy Trade*. Washington, DC: Greenpeace, 1992.)

Furthermore, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment reports that increasing combustion of fossil fuels has resulted in air pollution levels in the cities of less-industrialized countries that are among the highest in the world.¹⁸⁹

Many countries now face energy choices that will endure for decades. Industrialized countries must contend with the inertia of existing infrastructures that stifle energy reform, but younger countries can more quickly implement efficiency measures and renewable systems that are not only cost-





effective and sustainable, but that can mitigate poverty and create durable employment. Encouragement from international lending institutions would provide a substantive incentive to choose clean energy alternatives, but there is little indication that the World Bank and others will significantly shift from the current priorities of lending for fossil fuel expansion or destructive large-scale hydro—at least not without international pressure to do so.

Jose Goldemberg, et al. writing for the World Resources Institute, report that energy conservation with use of the best energy efficient technologies alone may be adequate for meeting the present needs of less-industrialized countries without increasing the energy supply.¹⁹⁰ The International Institute for Energy conservation has suggested that with only a 10-percent increase in energy use, the most energy efficient technologies could raise the average standard of living to the level of Western Europe in the 1970s.¹⁹¹ That 10 percent, and much more, could be provided by renewable energy systems.

These figures, too, sound almost unbelievable in the context of the current political structure and a global energy infrastructure and marketplace that is so heavily weighted toward fossil fuels. But the technological realities of clean energy are very much with us. The barriers are political.

For those who find such projections difficult to believe, there is the real world perspective of what has already been accomplished with efficiency improvements: in the United States, measures to conserve energy have provided seven times more energy since 1973 than all other efforts combined to build new power plants and drill new gas and oil wells.¹⁹²

Advocates for what has become, for all intents and purposes, a fossil fuel ideology, will deny and resist this reality for as long as the market for fossil fuels holds up. Because the objective of this ideology is to ever build the supply of energy, there is fun-

damental resistance to attempts to decrease the demand for the energy. This seems a simplistic statement, but it is profoundly at the heart of the seeming ease with which methane—another finite, polluting fossil fuel—has been so readily endorsed when alternatives are at hand.

The Cost of Clean Energy Versus Fossil Fuels

Proponents of natural gas and other traditional fuels argue that renewable energy systems are not practical for widespread applications, not cost-effective, and not available today. On the contrary, appropriately scaled, regionally tailored renewable energy systems are cost-competitive with fossil fuels and nuclear energy today even though they have been forced to develop without the help of government subsidies that favor conventional fuels.

For those of us in the United States, it is "cheap" to step on the gas or turn up a thermostat because we have been awash in fuels that move cheaply onto the marketplace. However, the costs of the fuels manifest themselves in tangible ways that we have been conditioned to ignore.

For example, the United States spends about \$100 billion each year on gasoline and another \$100 billion each year in attempts to mitigate the impacts of air pollution—costs that do not show up at the gas pump.¹⁹³ As another example, researchers at Cornell University estimate that energy-related ozone emissions reduce U.S. crop yields by as much as 30 percent.¹⁹⁴ Some estimates place the "hidden" costs of energy use in the United States as high as \$300 billion a year.¹⁹⁵ That amount is in addition to an annual fuel bill approximating \$450 billion.

However, many fossil fuel or nuclear energy externalities are not quantifiable using present-day models. How does one quan-

tify the true cost of an *Exxon Valdez* or a Chernobyl? Or of destruction of natural habitat, loss of species diversity, boom-bust employment cycles, build-up of toxic wastes, human poverty, global warming, and forest death?

These are the questions that must be asked before energy choices are made, and they are the kinds of questions that are too seldom addressed in the United States, where the fossil fuel industry not only inflicts a huge cost on people and the environment, but receives upward of \$26 billion every year in federal tax credits and subsidies.¹⁹⁶ If these subsidies were stripped away and the hidden costs accounted for, we would likely find that it is fossil fuels, not renewable sources, that have never become truly cost-effective sources of energy.

It is remarkable to realize that even in the face of market barriers, political opposition, and a powerful ideology, renewable energy systems have still accomplished quantum technological leaps in the last decade.

Wind power is competitive with some utility systems even without subsidies and externality costing requirements. U.S. Windpower, Inc. has produced a technology that generates electricity for 5 cents/kilowatt-hour.¹⁹⁷ A U.S. DOE-sponsored study reports that the wind power available in just 12 states in the country's midsection is more than enough to provide for all U.S. electric power needs.¹⁹⁸

Solar energy technologies have made similar advances. The U.S. DOE has projected that system and operating costs for solar thermal electric-generating and process heat plants will be competitive with fossil-fired power plants by 1995.¹⁹⁹ Photovoltaic (PV) costs have dropped precipitously, despite seemingly insurmountable political and market-place resistance. Present costs are still greater than conventional electricity, but are rapidly falling. With PV, the pay-back time and convenience weigh in heavily. A 40-square meter solar array mounted on a south-facing rooftop in an

area of average solar radiation in the United States produces as much electricity as is consumed by a typical U.S. household.²⁰⁰

Land-use constraints of solar power and wind are frequently cited as obstacles to widespread use, but in fact, the land-use requirements of renewables are less than or equivalent to those of fossil fuel, nuclear, and large-scale hydro. The difference is that conventional fuels use (and usually destroy) land at the point of extraction, whereas renewables use (and usually sustain) land at the point of generation.

Missing the Boat

It may be that the United States has already irretrievably relinquished its once-leading edge on renewable energy technologies. Renewable systems that were invented and proven in the United States have been taken over by Japan, Germany, and other countries, because the United States has created political and economic disincentives against them. The United States will be faced with the irony of importing these technologies back into the country once the rest of the world has effected the transition to clean energy.

Renewable technologies offer the opportunity to diversify economies, create employment, and generate energy that does not poison the planet. Recent studies of energy industry employment indicate that, overall, renewable energy sources employ two to five times as many people for every unit of electricity generated as fossil or nuclear sources.²⁰¹ Energy conservation measures create even more jobs than renewables. For every \$1 billion that is shifted from fossil fuel installations to investments in efficient and renewable energy installations, 30,000 job-years will be created.²⁰² This comes as no surprise when one considers that non-fossil energy systems are much more labor-intensive and that they process a sustainable resource; there is no bust to follow jobs created by clean energy.





Another positive benefit of clean energy technologies is that they can spawn new industries. For example:

"the Japanese successfully supported their photovoltaics industries while they developed a market in consumer products. Now, millions of calculators all over the world are powered by Japanese solar cells. We would do well to learn from their example."²⁰³

The United States will not regain its lead in innovative clean energy technologies if the status quo continues. Two disparate studies by the U.S. DOE give an indication of what is needed. One study estimated that the contribution of renewables to the U.S. energy mix would rise by only 15 quads (annual energy use from all sources is around 85 quads); the second study projected that renewables could provide 90 percent of the 111 quads needed by the year 2010. The factor creating the wide discrepancy is different assumptions about the level of federal research and development funding: from 1981 to 1989, this funding dropped by 84 percent.²⁰⁴

The National Energy Policy Act of 1992 has, finally, mandated a few subsidies for renewable energy and efficiency, but they are far too meager and long overdue. Much more substantive efforts to correct fossil fuel-biased markets will be required to slow the rate at which natural gas is monopolizing supply decisions for the utility and transportation sectors.

Threshold Opportunities: A Case In Point

Commonly heard arguments against wind and solar energy cite problems with energy storage and transmission and lack of applicability as a transportation fuel. Solar-generated hydrogen fuel has the promise to stand up to all these concerns. Of particular promise are hydrogen fuel cells.

Hydrogen fuel, if generated by clean energy sources, is pollution-free (with the exception of minute quantities of nitrogen oxide) and produces no global warming emissions.²⁰⁵ Most hydrogen production today results from the use of fossil fuels as raw material. Solar hydrogen would use only water, energy from the sun, and the components of a photovoltaic system (which are not without toxicity problems).

A 1991 Sandia National Laboratory study contracted by the U.S. DOE concluded:

We can continue to expand valuable hydrocarbons as our main source of hydrogen, or we can start now and by the late 1990s have profitable commercial solar hydrogen production plants coming on line. We must start now.²⁰⁶

Unfortunately, the U.S. DOE has not heeded this excellent advice. As has been the pattern in the 1980s with renewable technologies, other countries have been quick to recognize the promise of solar hydrogen. U.S. funding for solar hydrogen research and development has run around \$3 million a year, compared to \$20 million in Japan and \$50 million in Germany.²⁰⁷

As we now import crude oil from Saudi Arabia, will we some day import solar hydrogen in cryogenic tankers? Germany and Saudi Arabia are working together on an extensive solar hydrogen demonstration project with a PV generator coupled with an electrolysis plant in Saudi Arabia. A study from the Abdulaziz University in Saudi Arabia concluded that the country's large desalinization system, its location in the sun-belt, and its expertise in energy production all promise that "Saudi Arabia can acquire a prominent place in the world as a net exporter of solar hydrogen energy...in the early part of the 21st century."²⁰⁸

One of the most comprehensive analyses of solar hydrogen to date was completed by Joan Ogden and Robert Williams for the World Resources Institute. They found that if only 10 percent of fleet vehicles in the United States were converted to hydrogen,



demand would be great enough to justify pipeline construction from the U.S. Southwest (where insolation—sunlight to surface area—is high) to the Northeast in order to move solar hydrogen to that region.²⁰⁹

Arguments against using solar hydrogen as a transportation fuel are similar to those that constrained compressed natural gas-powered vehicles in the past. For example:

- 1) both have a public perception of fire/explosion risk;
- 2) both have a low density of energy (in comparison with gasoline), requiring greater quantities of fuel on board and limiting driving range;²¹⁰
- 3) both are lacking in coordinated distribution systems (although CNG stations are quickly springing up);
- 4) both require relatively expensive modifications of vehicles to permit their use.

There are three significant factors that they do not have in common:

- 1) one is finite, polluting, and a cause of global warming;
- 2) one has an infrastructure in place for production, distribution, and marketing;
- 3) one has powerful political backing.

Ogden and Williams suggest that the technological constraints (development of more efficient PV modules and highly fuel efficient vehicles) to widespread solar hydrogen use in transportation can be overcome by the turn of the century, but only if public policy initiatives "facilitate a shift from fossil fuels to PV hydrogen."²¹¹

In 1992, legislation was introduced to provide support for solar hydrogen as a transportation fuel, but received so little interest that the bill has been rewritten to favor hydrogen production from natural gas. (Hydrogen produced from methane would increase CO₂ emissions by 25 percent over gasoline, and cost 4.4 times more.²¹²) The advocates for solar hydrogen have not found a champion in Congress; most congressional committees are sold on natural gas and clean coal.

Findings such as those from the Sandia National Laboratory study are falling on deaf ears, and the country is rapidly losing the opportunity to take the lead in solar hydrogen research and development. Sandia's suggestion that industry and government should share the cost of pilot-scale development with the use of existing government-owned solar collector systems has not been implemented, although the payback potential would be significant and include:

- 1) reduced consumption (conservation of natural hydrocarbons);
- 2) reduction of CO₂ and other pollutants;
- 3) generation of domestic and world markets for solar hydrogen processes.²¹³

Most studies suggest that although hydrogen is the clear choice for the long term, we must accept the convenience and political acceptability of natural gas for the short term (i.e., two decades) as a transition fuel.²¹⁴ Some suggest that hythane (a mix of hydrogen and methane) be used with incrementally increased portions of hydrogen to phase out methane over the next few decades. But, again, once the infrastructure and market incentives are firmly in place for natural gas, there will be little will to convert to hydrogen and other available renewable technologies until we have exhausted "cheap" natural gas. And, if the price of gas becomes prohibitive and/or supply limited, the distribution infrastructure for natural gas can also transport synthetic fuels made from coal and other dirty carbon fuels already owned by the same companies—just as many of the power-generating systems coming on line today will be able to burn the gasified fuels.

Energy Choices Made Now Will Last Decades

The industrialized North and large multinational lending institutions inflict their bias for fossil fuels on long-term energy planning in the less-industrialized world. This has been the case for decades, but in the era



of global free markets, free trade agreements driven by the North, not national governments, will largely determine policies of energy extraction and consumption.

As one example of the threshold moments for energy choices in the coming years, the government of Pakistan has moved to expand oil and gas production, remove controls on upstream oil and gas operations, and "cut red tape in permitting,"²¹⁵ in order to attract foreign investors—a process that is underway in virtually all countries now.

At the same time, the Clean Energy Research Institute in Florida published a report entitled *A Clean and Permanent Energy Infrastructure for Pakistan: Solar-Hydrogen Energy System*, which found that implementing a solar hydrogen infrastructure in Pakistan would "eliminate the import dependence of fossil fuels, increase gross product per capita, reduce pollution, improve quality of life, and establish a permanent and clean energy system."²¹⁶

We have singled out solar hydrogen as an example of missed—or about to be missed—opportunities. But we would caution that no one energy system can provide a long-term solution for global, sustainable energy. It would be a grave error to advocate one particular fuel as the panacea to the world's energy dilemma. This is the sort of simplistic thinking that entrenched us in oil addiction, and threatens to do the same with natural gas.

One of the benefits of renewable energy systems is that they are diverse, and so can be appropriately selected and scaled for the communities they serve. No energy system is without its downside in terms of environmental and human health, but thoughtfully selected renewable energy mixes that are used with maximum efficiency can minimize negative impacts in ways that will never be possible for fossil fuels, nuclear power, or large-scale hydropower.

Conclusion

Efficiency and renewable energy systems can slow climate change processes and reduce pollution of air, land, and water. They can also help stabilize the world economy. Natural gas cannot.

Viewed in isolation, certain attributes of natural gas make it seem less harmful than other carbon-based energy sources: lower carbon content, fewer emissions of sulfur and reactive hydrocarbons, and reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions when used in stationary sources. Viewed synergistically, however, the impacts of natural gas production, distribution, and combustion on the global and local environments make it clear that this fuel is not the benign little blue flame it is portrayed to be.

As the accolades for natural gas continue to pile up, as the infrastructure to produce and distribute gas grows ever more extensive and the marketplace more biased, the future becomes more certain for long-term expanded use of this fuel. Natural gas is excluding the entry of renewable energy and efficiency into the utility and transportation sectors.

The United States has only the space of a few years to reverse this trend. Once the next round of competitive bidding for new electricity supply is completed and combustion turbines and combined cycle systems are in place; once Detroit has retooled for

natural gas vehicles and CNG refilling stations are in every city, we will be stuck paying off the tremendous sunk costs of that investment. We will not have another opportunity to implement clean energy again for decades.

Perpetuating fossil fuel dependence in the United States is not the only concern. In today's reign of free markets and free trade agreements, industrialized countries cannot make energy choices in isolation. Accords such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative will ensure that the entire Western Hemisphere must follow the lead of the world's most energy-hungry country down the fossil fuel dead-end street.

Indeed, all less-industrialized countries are under tremendous pressure from the North to open their borders to Northern-based transnational oil and gas corporations. Borderless, unregulated trade in fossil fuels will certainly enhance corporate profits for the next several decades, but it will do nothing to achieve genuine energy security for all peoples. Efficient energy systems that provide services to people can mitigate poverty and environmental degradation, and earn profits that are free of boom-bust cycles and depleted resource bases.



The consequences of global warming—sea level rise, drought, catastrophic typhoons and hurricanes, forest death, epidemics—will likely be the most severe in the countries lining the equatorial belt: countries that are today making the choice to build a fossil fuel infrastructure rather than a renewable one. This impending tragedy is all the more disturbing for the fact that equatorial belt regions are ideally situated for optimum renewable energy potential from the sun and wind. This is not to say that effects of climate change will not be catastrophic in the United States as well, where the grain belt may shift to more northern latitudes, and what remains of the Gulf of Mexico wetlands and the cities of the east coast may be lost to sea level rise.

It is ironic that the Bush administration and other national governments have not questioned the need for supply mega-projects such as the Trans Alaska Gas System, the massive natural gas pipeline on the drawing board for Southeast Asia, or the gas pipeline that will connect the Russian Arctic with Japan even as the U.S. DOE National Energy Strategy minimized the poten-

tial of solar energy systems. It is also ironic that the magnitude of subsidized coalbed methane production, for example, was unflinchingly accepted, while wind power technologies that have accomplished clean, competitive, cost-effective power generation without subsidies are still resisted by traditional energy planners. Ironical that we can dream up outlandish carbon-sequestering projects to trap CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels, even as we continue to dream up outlandish carbon-sequestering projects to trap CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and inject them into the depths of the oceans.

The Clinton/Gore administration has come to office at the precise moment when the country sways at a crossroad of possible energy futures. The impetus to continue on the path of fossil fuels is powerful, but both leaders have demonstrated their commitment to change, and to ensuring that the needs of all people are met—including the most basic need for a healthy world. Reversing their endorsement of natural gas is critical if they hope to remain consistent with that commitment.

Notes and References

1. According to the Stockholm Environment Institute, allowing temperatures to build higher than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial will run the gauntlet of a threshold beyond which "risks of grave danger to ecosystems, and of non-linear responses, are expected to increase rapidly." Krause, F., et al. "Energy Policy in the Greenhouse." The International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths, September 1989. Personal communication from Jeremy Leggett, Director of Science, Greenpeace International, January 1993.

2. Cogan, Douglas. *The Greenhouse Gambit*. Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1992, p. 3.

3. As a rough rule of thumb, a one-degree Celsius change in temperature is equivalent to a change in latitude from 100 to 150 kilometers. Houghton, Richard, and George Woodwell. "Global Climatic Change." *Scientific American* 1989, p. 43.

4. Many insurance companies worldwide—those not already bankrupt by claims associated with recent catastrophic tropical storms—are refusing to insure low-latitude coastal regions. See: Leggett, Jeremy. "Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Solidarity Among the Risk Community." Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace, February 1993.

5. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), convened by the UN Environmental Programme, the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, have suggested that 60 to 80 percent reductions are required to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations. Bierbaum, Richard, and Robert Friedman. "The Road to Reduced Carbon Emissions." *Issues in Science and Technology* National Academy of Sciences, Winter 1992, p. 65.

6. As reported in Cogan, Richard. *The Greenhouse Gambit*. Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1992, p. 393.

7. The United States is uniquely poised to launch demonstration projects of workable, available clean energy technologies and to assist other countries to implement them.

8. MacKenzie, James. World Resources Institute. Conference: Meeting the Energy Challenges of the 1990s: Experts Define the Key Policy Issues, Panel 2: Energy and the Environment, GAO/RCED-91-66, July 1990, p. 95.

9. Gordon, Deborah. *Steering A New Course: Transportation, Energy and the Environment*. Washington, DC: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1991, p. 28.

10. U.S. Department of Energy. *Compressed and Liquefied Natural Gas: Just the Facts*. Factsheet prepared by the Department of Energy, February 1992.

11. American Gas Association Planning and Analysis Group. "Projected Natural Gas Demand from Vehicles Under the Mobile Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments." *State of the World 1991*. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, January 30, 1991, pp. 36 and 202.

12. Hirshberg, Alan, and Richard Scullary. "Natural Gas Vehicles: The Race for Profits." *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 10/1/92, p. 45.

13. Cogan, op. cit., note 2, p. 302.

14. Cogan, op. cit., note 2, p. 301. Note: The CO₂ emissions are determined by the carbon content of the fuel as well as the efficiency and type of combustion process.

15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. *Analysis of the Economic and Environmental Effects of Compressed Natural Gas as a Vehicle Fuel*. Volume I. Office of Mobil Sources, April 1990, pp. 33-35.

16. Bleviss, Deborah, and P. Walzer. "Energy For Motor Vehicles." *Energy for Planet Earth, Readings from Scientific American*. New York: WH Freeman & Co, 1991, p. 54: "...methane produces about 20 percent less greenhouse gas than gasoline does in terms of equivalent quantities of carbon dioxide; Gordon, op. cit., note 9, p. 80: "switching to CNG may result in moderate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 19 percent lower than conventional fuels."; Ogden, Joan, and Robert Williams. *Solar Hydrogen, Moving Beyond Fossil Fuels*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, October 1989, p. 67, table 17: CO₂ emission rates (kg/km) at 50 mpg are 0.125



for crude/gasoline/diesel and 0.084 for natural gas; Rosen, Jerome. "Running on Methane." *Mechanical Engineering* May 1990, p. 66-71: "because natural gas is carbon-poor compared to gasoline, it produces about one-third less CO₂."; Personal communication from Debra Adler, U.S. EPA, 2/29/93.

17. Hirshberg and Scullery, op. cit., note 12.

18. Anonymous. "National Energy Strategy Passes Congress: Boost Seen for AFV's." *AFDC Update* Washington, DC: Alternative Fuels Data Center, November 1992.

19. *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/5/92, p. 31.

20. California Energy Commission. *1988 Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions*. Final Staff Report, October 1990, p. A8; Note: In some instances, when a reservoir has passed peak production and secondary recovery techniques are utilized, CO₂ separated from the production stream is reinjected into the reservoir to force enhanced recovery. This technique is used in some aging fields, such as Prudhoe Bay.

21. Personal communication from Kevin Jardine, Greenpeace Canada Atmosphere and Energy Campaign. Jardine cites from "The Significance of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas Operations in Canada Relative to the Natural Environment and Global Warming" by the Canadian Gas Association, 1989, which estimates average carbon dioxide emissions from natural gas wells at 7 percent with a high of 24 percent. It is not known at this writing if this estimate includes CO₂ vented during the refining process, but presumably not.

22. California Energy Commission, op. cit., note 20, A-27.

23. ICF Resources. *Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Policies on the Electric Utility Industry: Costs, Impacts and Opportunities*. Prepared for the Edison Electric Institute, Washington, DC, January 1992, in Cogan, Douglas, op. cit., note 2, p. 350.

24. *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 10/1/92, p. 389.

25. Flavin, Christopher. "Building a Bridge to Sustainable Energy." *State of the World 1992*, Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1992, p. 35.

26. Hay, Nelson. *Natural Gas Applications for Clean Air Pollution Control 1991*. Fairmont Press, 1987, p. 59.

27. Hilt, Richard, and Marie Lihn. "The Clean Air Act's Impact on Natural Gas Markets." *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 10/15/91, p. 21.

28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Standards for Emissions from Natural Gas-Fueled and Liquefied Petroleum Gas-Fueled Motor

Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Engines..." 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600, 11/5/91.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. U.S. EPA. op. cit., note 15, p. 35: Of three vehicles studied, the methane tailpipe emissions expressed as gram/mile were, respectively, 2.5, 3.2, and 1.5.

32. Anonymous. "Natural Gas Alternative Fuels Studied." *Chemical and Engineering News* May 4, 1992, pp. 24-25: This study further cautions that use of CNG and LNG would probably add to the global warming potential over the next 20 years, especially if venting and flaring of methane are assumed to continue.

33. Ibid; French, Hilary. *Worldwatch Paper #94: Clearing the Air, A Global Agenda*. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, January 1990, p. 28.

34. Rosen, op. cit. note 16, p. 68; Anonymous. "Alternative Auto Fuels Pose Cost or Technical Challenge." *Oil and Gas Journal* December 9, 1991, p. 57-61: "Emissions of NO_x are likely to be higher for a dedicated CNG vehicle than for gasoline-powered vehicles."; U.S. EPA, op. cit., note 15, 1990, p. 30; Cogan, op. cit., note 2, p. 301.

35. Rosen, op. cit., note 16, p. 68.

36. Ibid.

37. *Oil and Gas Journal* 12/9/91, op. cit., note 34, p. 59.

38. U.S. EPA, op. cit., note 15, p. 31-33.

39. Flavin, op. cit., note 25, p. 36.

40. Presentation to the Panel on Energy and the Environment, in General Accounting Office Report GAO/RECE-91-66, "Meeting the Energy Challenges of the 1990s: Experts Define the Key Policy Issues." Washington, DC, March 1991.

41. U.S. EPA, op. cit., note 15, p. 33.

42. U.S. General Accounting Office. *Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of Gasoline Consumption*. GAO/RCED-92-260, September 1992, p. 4.

43. Anonymous. "Rethinking the Ozone Problem in Urban and Regional Air Pollution." *The Energy Report* 12/23/91, p. 20.

44. Ibid: estimated cost of NO_x reduction at \$5,000/ton; Personal communication from Andrew Kerr, Greenpeace International. March 1992. Kerr cites Persson, K. "Low Cost Technology for Desulphurisation and NO_x Reduction in Existing Power and District Heating Boilers." which states the cost of achieving 85-90 percent reductions in NO_x emissions using SCR (selective catalytic reduction) is 1 SEK/kg, or \$141 per U.S. ton.

45. *The Energy Report* 12/23/91, op. cit., note 43.



46. U.S. Department of Energy. *National Energy Strategy: First Edition 1991-1992*. February 1991, pp. 86-96.

47. Personal communication from Jeremy Leggett, Director of Science, Greenpeace International, February 1992; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment*. Prepared by Working Group 1, 1992.

48. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment*. 1990; Hogan, Kathleen, et al., *Anthropogenic Methane Emissions in the United States: Estimates For 1990*, Review Draft, October 1992; Report to Congress. Global Change Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.

49. IPCC, op. cit., note 47.

50. Pearce, Fred. "Methane: The Hidden Greenhouse Gas." *New Scientist* 5/6/89, p. 4; Leggett, Jeremy. "The Importance of Considering the Worst-Case Analysis in Global Warming: Background to the New Survey of Climate Scientists." Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace International, 2/9/92, p. 5-7.

51. Hogan, EPA, op. cit., note 48.

52. Based on IPCC data in Hogan, et al., op. cit., note 48, p. 1-4.

53. Ibid.

54. Wilson, Deborah. "Quantifying and Comparing Fuel-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Coal, Oil and Natural Gas Consumption." *The Energy Policy* July/Aug 1990, p. 552; Donaldson, D.M., and G.E. Betteridge. "The Relative Cost Effectiveness of Various Measures to Ameliorate Global Warming." *Energy Policy* July/Aug 1990, p. 570; Max Willis suggests higher estimates: "The levels of fossil methane in the atmosphere appear to imply up to 6 to 9 percent leakage of gas worldwide." Willis, Max. "Leaking Gas in the Greenhouse." *Nature* 12/12/91, p. 428.

55. Mackenzie, Deborah. "Leaking Gas Mains Help to Warm the Globe." *New Scientist* 9/22/90, p. 24; Wilson, Deborah. "Quantifying and Comparing Fuel-Cycle Greenhouse-Gas Emissions: Coal, Oil and Natural Gas Consumption." *Energy Policy* July/Aug. 1990, p. 557; Mitchell, Catherine, et al., "A Study of Leakage from the UK Natural Gas Distribution System." *Energy Policy* Nov. 1990, p. 809-818; Lelieveld, Joe, and Paul Crutzen. "Indirect Chemical Effects of Methane on Global Warming." *Nature* 1/23/92, p. 341.

56. Hogan, EPA, op. cit., note 48, p. 2-2.

57. Ibid., p. 7-11.

58. Ibid., p. 2-49.

59. American Gas Association. "Natural Gas Transmission and Emissions." Arlington, VA: AGA Engineering Technical Notes, 1989; Abra-

hamson, D. "Relative Greenhouse Effect of Fossil Fuels and the Critical Contribution of Methane." University of Minnesota, 1989; Barns, D., and J. Edmonds. "An Evaluation of the Relationship Between the Production and Use of Energy and Atmospheric Methane Emissions." Prepared for the Office of Energy Research, U.S. Department of Energy. 1990; Radian Corporation. "Estimates of U.S. Methane Emissions (Draft Peer Review Report)." Vol. 1. in Hogan, EPA, op.cit., note 48.

60. Ibid.

61. Davis, Ged. "Energy For Planet Earth." *Energy for Planet Earth, Readings From Scientific American Magazine*. New York: WH Freeman & Co, 1991, p. 2.

62. Willis, op. cit., note 54, p. 428..

63. Hogan, op. cit., note 48, p. 2-42.

64. *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/12/92, page 34.

65. American Petroleum Institute. *Basic Petroleum Data Book: Petroleum Industry Statistics*. Vol XI, #3, September 1991, Section XI, Table 6a: In 1989, offshore production was 5.2 tcf, onshore production 12.8.

66. U.S. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service. "Natural Gas Gaining National Attention as the Predominant Energy Source." *Today* Vol. 1, #3, 1991, p. 4.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. U.S. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service. *Accidents Associated With Oil And Gas Operations, OCS 1956-1986*. MMS 88-0011, pp. 9-36 and 185-227.

70. Drilling Discharges in the Marine Environment. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1983, p. 16.

71. Shuey, Chris. "At War in the Oil Patch," *The Workbook* Fall 1990, Southwest Research and Information Center, p. 97; Speer, Lisa. Testimony of NRDC, et al. Before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Natural Resources Defense Council, 3/10/88, p. 3.

72. 316 million barrels of drilling fluids, 11 million barrels of drilling chemicals and other associated wastes, and 20.9 billion barrels of produced water nationwide in one year, for example. Shuey, Chris. "At War in the Oil Patch." *The Workbook* Fall 1990, Southwest Research and Information Center, p. 97.

73. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. *Report to Congress: Management of Wastes from the Exploration, Development and Production of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Geothermal Energy, Executive Summary*. December 1987, EPA 530SW-88-003-D, p. 48.



74. Anonymous. "Pollution Threatens Gulf of Mexico, Commission Sought." Reuter Library Report, 8/14/91.
75. Ibid.
76. Speer, op. cit., note 71, p. 3. Note: The amount of produced water varies constantly with the number of operating platforms, type of production, characteristics of the reservoir, state requirements, and so forth.
77. Ibid.
78. Personal communication from David Fruge, U.S. F&WS Field Supervisor to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 9/26/88.
79. Personal communication from the U.S. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service. "Response to Issues Raised in a Letter from the Oregon Natural Resources Council."
80. Speer, Lisa, and Sue Libenson. *Oil in the Arctic: The Environmental Record of Oil Development on Alaska's North Slope*. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al, January 1988, p. iii.
81. Anonymous. "Environment Pollution Agency Issues Rules Against Washington." United Press International, August 24, 1992.
82. Shuey, op. cit., note 71, p. 104.
83. State of Louisiana Coastal Resources Program. *Written Comments on the Five Year Draft Proposal*. State of Louisiana. 1991, p. 29.
84. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. *Saving Louisiana's Coastal Wetlands: The Need for a Long-Term Plan of Action*. April 1987, Report of the Louisiana Wetland Protection Panel, EPA-230-02-87-026, p. 1; Schueler, Donald. "Losing Louisiana." *Audubon* July 1990, p. 81.
85. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. *Report to Congress, Management of Wastes From the Exploration, Development and Production of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Geothermal Energy*. December 1987, Damage Case TX-55, p. C-53.
86. Speer and Libenson, op. cit., note 80, p. vi.
87. Louisiana Department of Natural Resources. *Information Supplement to Lease Sale #135*. 7/29/91, p. 41.
88. U.S. Department of Interior. *OCS National Compendium: OCS Oil and Gas Information Through October 1990*. MMS 91-0032, pp. 148-149.
89. Ibid.
90. Louisiana DNR, op. cit., note 87, pp. 24-25.
91. *Alaska Daily News*, 10/26/91 and 10/15/91, respectively.
92. County of Santa Barbara. "Point Arguello Field and Gaviota Processing Facility Area Study and Chevron/Texaco Development Plans EIR/EIS; Technical Appendix O, System and Reliability, 10/84." In Wald, Johanna, and Ann Nothoff. *Comments of the Central Coast OCS Regional Studies Program and the Natural Resources Defense Council on the OCS Natural Gas and Oil Resource Management Program, 1992-1997*. 4/91, p. 38.
93. County of Santa Barbara. *Siting Gas Processing Facilities, Screening and Siting Criteria*. Resource Management Department, March 1990, p. 49.
94. Ibid, p. 83.
95. Ibid, p. 88.
96. Wald and Nothoff, op. cit., note 92, p. 41.
97. Michigan Department of Public Health. *EOH Focus*, Winter 1991.
98. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. *EPA Comments, PGT/PG&E, Altamont Natural Gas Pipelines FERC DEIS*, March 1991, 2/15/91, p. 2.
99. Anonymous. "Enron Sees Major Increases in U.S. Gas Supply and Demand." *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/7/91, p. 76. Note: As this report goes to press, the *Oil and Gas Journal* just released a report showing 12,156 miles of pipeline will be completed in 1993 and beyond in the United States; Koen, A.D. "Gas Line Activity Packing Growth in World Pipeline Construction Work." *Oil and Gas Journal* 2/8/93, p. 25.
100. U.S. EPA, op. cit., note 98, p. 2 of cover letter.
101. DOE. *National Energy Strategy* op. cit., note 46, p. 93.
102. *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/12/92, p. 24.
103. Ogden, Joan, and Robert Williams. *Solar Hydrogen: Moving Beyond Fossil Fuels*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, October 1989, p. 51.
104. U.S. General Accounting Office. *Natural Gas Pipelines: Greater Use of Instrumented Inspection Technology Can Improve Safety*. GAO/RCED-92-237. September 1992, p. 2.
105. Ibid., p. 14.
106. Ibid., p. 15.
107. U.S. Congress. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Water, Power and Offshore Energy Resources. Report prepared by Cuba Wadlington, Jr., 9/19/90, p. 19.
108. U.S. Coast Guard. *Vessel Management Plan and Emergency Plan*. Port of Boston Marine Safety Office LNG-LPG. 3/30/89.
109. Wadlington, op. cit., note 107, p. 16.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., p. 17.
112. Ibid.
113. DOE. *National Energy Strategy* op. cit., note 46, p. 93.
114. Willaims, Bob. "Natural Gas, Fuel of the Future." *International Petroleum Encyclopedia* 1991, p. 256.



115. American Petroleum Institute, op. cit., note 46, p. 93.
116. Ibid.
117. *The Energy Report* 4/20/92, p. 289.
118. Anonymous. "One More Worry for a Tough Year." *Oil and Gas Journal* 1/27/92: "This year, the world may officially declare its intention to end the petroleum age. The declaration could come in June at the UN Conference on Environment and Development."; Woodbury, Richard. "The Great Energy Bust." *TIME* March 16, 1992, pp. 50-51: "The big concern now (of the petroleum industry) is the depressed market for gas, which is still the target of most drilling because its plentiful reserves are largely untapped and exploration carries tax breaks for investors."
119. *The Energy Report* 2/24/92, p. 136.
120. *Oil and Gas Journal* 3/23/92, p. 3; *Oil and Gas Journal* 3/30/92, p. 24.
121. *Pipeline and Gas Journal* June 1992, p. 6.
122. *The Energy Report* 8/1/92, p. 589.
123. Anonymous. "Gas Reliability Key to Market Growth." *Oil and Gas Journal* 9/21/92, p. 23.
124. *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 9/1/92, p. 11.
125. Although the price of gas has recovered more quickly than analysts predicted since late summer of 1992, it is unlikely that the price of gas will spike and stabilize at a level high enough to allow renewables and efficiency an immediate share of the market. Some suggest that the current rebound in the price of gas was spurred by Hurricane Andrew's slowdown (or perceived slowdown) in Gulf of Mexico production and its consequences on the spot markets. Just as pipeline service unbundling, free trade accords, pro-rationing and other market mechanisms assisted the recovery in gas prices, it can also help stabilize them at the level that makes new drilling profitable and yet keeps the market cost low enough to exclude competition.
126. *Oil and Gas Journal* 9/21/92, p. 3.
127. *Oil and Gas Journal* 12/28/93, p. 45; DeGolyer/MacNaughton. *Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics: 1991*, Chart #14; *Basic Petroleum Data Book: Petroleum Industry Statistics*. Vol XI, #3, Section XIII, Table 1a, Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, 9/91.
128. *Oil and Gas Journal* 12/28/93, p. 45.
129. U.S. Department of Energy. *Federal Oil Research: A Strategy for Maximizing the Producibility of Known U.S. Oil*, DE89-015643. August 1989.
130. U.S. Department of Energy. *Natural Gas Strategic Plan and Multi-Year Program Crosscut Plan FY 1993-1998, Draft Working Document*, DOE/FE-0251P. April 1992, p. 1-12; Enron reports that with continued technological improvements, U.S. total economically recoverable natural gas resources will total 1,200 tcf; "Enron Sees Major Increases in U.S. Gas Supply, Demand." *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/7/91, p. 75; Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 1992*, p. 39 reports that U.S. resources are in the range of 1,000 to 1,300 tcf.
131. Anonymous. "World Gas Supply Seen Ample for Decades as Demand Expands." *Oil and Gas Journal* 11/9/92, p. 105.
132. Hays, Nelson. *Natural Gas Applications for Air Pollution Control*. Fairmont Press, 1987; Note: However, recent U.S. estimates of recoverable resources have included coalbed methane and tight sands.
133. *Oil and Gas Journal* 6/22/91, pp. 84-87; Nelson Hays, op. cit., note 132, puts the estimate up to a possible 270 million tcf.
134. U.S. Department of Energy. *Natural Gas Strategic Plan*. op. cit., pp. 3-14, 3-15.; *Offshore* April 1992, p. 20; *Oil and Gas Journal* 6/22/92, pp. 84-87.
135. Ibid.
136. Stump, Ken, and Carol Alexander. *The North American Free Trade Agreement and Energy Trade*. Washington, DC: Greenpeace, 1992.
137. Department of Energy. Information Administration. *International Energy Outlook 1992*. Washington, DC: DOE/EIA Office of Energy Markets and End Use, p. 17.
138. Ibid. Note: Just received as this report goes to press are new estimates from the *Oil and Gas Journal* indicating the U.S. market share for natural gas will reach 25.2 percent in 1993 (far ahead of EIA predictions); Beck, Robert. "U.S. Oil and Gas Demand Set to Grow Again in 1993." *Oil and Gas Journal* 1/25/93, p. 64.
139. *Oil and Gas Journal* 11/30/92, p. 1.; Koen, A.D. "U.S. Gas Industry Sees Signs of End to Lengthy Downturn." *Oil and Gas Journal* 1/11/93, p. 14.
140. Canadian Energy Research Institute. *Long-Term Outlook for World Gas Trade 1990-2015*. Calgary, Canada, 1991.
141. Johnson, Elbert, and Albert Viscio. "U.S. Gas Pipeline Construction Will Help Producers and Consumers." *Oil and Gas Journal* 11/4/91, p. 79.
142. *Oil and Gas Journal* 9/14/92, p. 47.
143. *Oil and Gas Journal* 8/3/92, p. 26.
144. *Oil and Gas Journal* 11/23/92, p. 21.
145. Ibid.
146. Note: According to the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), "If Alberta's gas production increases as expected, it likely will be a mixed blessing for the province and Canada. ERCB expects Alberta's emissions of CO₂ to rise by 37 percent and nitrogen oxide



by 14 percent in the next 15 years. The board said the increases are based on the projection that natural gas will experience fairly rapid demand growth by 2005 as North Americans switch to gas." *Oil and Gas Journal* 4/8/92, p. 13.

147. *Hydrocarbon Processing* May 1992, p. 33.

148. Koen, A.D. "U.S., Canadian Pipelines and Producers Lining Up to Meet Mexican Gas Demand Growth." *Oil and Gas Journal* 4/6/92, p. 21.

149. U.S. Department of Energy. *National Energy Strategy* op. cit., note 46.

150. *Oil and Gas Journal* 12/28/92, p. 45.

151. *Ibid.*

152. American Petroleum Institute, op. cit., 12/28/92, p. 45.

153. British Petroleum. *Statistical Review of World Energy*, 1992. Cogan, op. cit., note 2.

154. Fulkerson, E., et al. "Energy From Fossil Fuels." *Energy for Planet Earth: Readings from Scientific American* p. 87.

155. *Ibid.*, Fig. 8.7.

156. *Ibid.*

157. Cogan, op. cit., note 2, p. 394.

158. Williams, Bob. "U.S. Petroleum Strategies in the Decade of the Environment." *International Petroleum Encyclopedia* 1991 Pennwell Books, 1991, p. 260.

159. Anonymous. "Gas Group Expands W. Virginia Cofiring Fight." *The Energy Report* 9/30/91, p. 696.

160. Gill, Douglas. "Acid Rain, Tailpipes and Natural Gas." *Oil and Gas Investor* Vol. 9, #4, 11/89, p. 72.

161. Abraham, Kurt S. "Where the Candidates Stand on Energy Policy." *World Oil* 10/92, p. 33-37.

162. Levy, Bruce, and Andrew Rosenlieb. "Producing Natural Gas from Coal Seams." *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 6/15/91, p. 53.

163. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

164. Davis, Bennett. "Where Credit is Due." *Oil and Gas Investor* 4/91, pp. 60-64.

165. *The Energy Report* 9/14/92, p. 623.

166. *Oil and Gas Journal* 11/2/92, pp. 21-26.

167. Anonymous. "Technology's Promise for Unconventional Gas." *Oil and Gas Journal* 10/5/92, p. 19.

168. Shuey, op. cit., note 71, p. 104.

169. According to the *Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph*, representatives of Amoco Production and Meridian Oil opposed rules to require complete water analyses for all domestic water wells close to drilling sites, and to outline circumstances under which the state would restrict or deny drilling or production, saying the testing would create legal problems that could hold up drilling, and that restriction or denial of drilling

or production permits would rob the companies of their legal rights. *Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph/AP*. "New Rules May Prevent Methane Pollution." 12/18/90.

170. *Modern Power Systems* 8/92, pp. 3,35,37.

171. Davis, Berkley. "Gas Turbines Dominate New Capacity Ordering." *Power Engineering* 8/89, p. 27.

172. Gottschalk, Arthur. *Journal of Commerce* In *Anchorage Daily News*, 9/4/92.

173. *Modern Power Systems* 8/92, p. 37.

174. Gottschalk, op. cit., note 172.

175. *Modern Power Systems* 8/92, p. 35.

176. *Oil and Gas Journal* 8/17/92, p. 103.

177. Department of Energy. *Natural Gas Strategic Plan*. op. cit., note 130, p. 3-13.

178. Koen, A.D. "More Hard Times Ahead for U.S. Gas Industry." *Oil and Gas Journal* 1/6/92, p. 23.

179. CO₂ is produced both in the gasifier as well as in the gas turbine combustor. "The emission of carbon dioxide cannot be avoided." *Modern Power Systems* 8/92, p. 35.

180. Fickett, Arnold, Clark Gellings, and Amory Lovins. "Efficient Use of Energy." *Energy for Planet Earth, Readings from Scientific American*. New York: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1991, p. 12.

181. Schneider, Claudine. "Preventing Climate Change." *Issues in Science and Technology* National Academy of Sciences, Summer 1989. p. 55.

182. Fickett, et al., op. cit, note 180.

183. Brower, Michael. *Cool Energy: The Renewable Solution to Global Warming*. Washington, DC: Union of Concerned Scientists. 1990, p. 13.

184. Flavin, Christopher. "Conquering U.S. Oil Dependence." *Worldwatch* Jan-Feb 1991, p. 28.

185. Shepard, Michael. "How to Improve Energy Efficiency." *Issues in Science and Technology* National Academy of Sciences, Summer 1991, p. 85.

186. Philips, Michael. *The Least Cost Energy Path for Developing Countries: Energy Efficient Investments for the Multilateral Development Banks*. Washington, DC: International Institute for Energy Conservation, 9/91, pp. 5, 12.

187. *Ibid.*, p. xii.

188. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

189. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. *Energy in Developing Countries*. January 1991, p. 15.

190. Goldemberg, Jose, et al. *Energy for a Sustainable World*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. September 1987, p. 33; Philips, op. cit., note 186, p. 112.

191. Philips, op. cit., note 186, p. 111.

192. Lovins, Amory, and Hunter Lovins. "Drill Rigs and Battleships are the Answer! But What

Was the Question?" Old Snowmass, Colorado: Rocky Mountain Institute. 4/16/88.

193. *The Energy Report* 11/29/89, p. 912; U.S. Congress. Senate. Environment Committee, Statement by Senator Max Baucus (D-MT); Schneider, op. cit., note 181, p. 58.

194. Hubbard, Harold, M. "The Real Cost of Energy." *Scientific American* 4/91, p. 37.

195. *Ibid.*, p. 36: suggests a range of \$100 to \$300 billion/annually.

196. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

197. Anonymous. "Producer Says New Turbine Puts Wind on Same Footing as Other Energy." *The Energy Report* 11/11/91, p. 821.

198. Elliott, D.L., et al. "Wind Energy Potential in the United States Considering Environmental and Land Use Exclusions." Pacific Northwest Laboratory: Richland, WA. 1991 *Solar World Congress, Proceedings of the Biennial Congress of the International Solar Energy Society*. Vol. 1, Part II. Denver, Colorado, 8/91.

199. Flavin, Christopher, and Rick Piltz. *Sustainable Energy*. Washington, DC: Renew America, 1989, p. 26.

200. Weinberg, Carl, and Robert Williams. "Energy From the Sun." *Energy for Planet Earth, Readings from Scientific American*. op. cit., note 16, p. 111.

201. Lent, Tom. *Energy for Employment*. Washington, DC: Greenpeace, April 1992, p. 13.

202. *Ibid.*

203. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

204. Anonymous. "Renewable Energy: Lay Your Money Down." *Technology Review* 7/16/90, pp. 15-17.

205. An electric current is conducted through water, which splits into oxygen and hydrogen

bubbles that then rise to the surface. The energy stored in the captured hydrogen is almost equal to that of the original current. If the current is provided by solar energy or some other clean energy, the system is free of pollution and inexhaustible. Stein, Jay. "Hydrogen: Clean, Safe and Inexhaustible." *The Amicus Journal* Spring 1990, p. 33.

206. Holmes, John, and Michael Prairie. *Commercializing Solar Hydrogen Production*. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. June 1991, DE91-011232 NTIS.

207. Ogden and Williams, op. cit., note 16, p. 93.

208. Zahed, A.H., et al. "A Perspective of Solar Hydrogen and its Utilization in Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Hydrogen Energy* Vol. 16, #4, 1991, pp. 277-281.

209. Ogden and Williams, op. cit., note 16.

210. Bleviss, Deborah, and Peter Walzer. "Energy from Motor Vehicles." *Energy for Planet Earth, Readings from Scientific American*. op. cit., note 16, pp. 54-55.

211. Ogden and Williams, op. cit., note 16, p. 3.

212. Cogan, op. cit., note 2, p. 304.

213. Holmes and Prairie, op. cit., note 206, p. 6.

214. Gordon, op. cit., note 9, pp. 108-109; Flavin, op. cit., note 25, p. 43; Ogden & Williams, op. cit., note 16, p. 24.

215. Anonymous. "Pakistan Oil, Gas Reforms Tied to Bid for Energy Self-Sufficiency by 2000." *Oil and Gas Journal* 12/9/91, p. 19.

216. Lutfi, N., and T. Veziroglu. "A Clean and Permanent Energy Infrastructure for Pakistan: Solar-Hydrogen Energy System." *The International Journal of Hydrogen Energy* Vol. 16, #3, p. 169.

